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Introduction
The availability of quantity information along with expenditure information in some household surveys allows the estimation of price reactions on the basis of unit values, defined as the ratio of expenditure and quantity for each good.
Deaton (1987, 1988, 1990 ) has proposed a strategy for estimating price reactions jointly with choice of unit values in data of this type. This entails the specification of a system of budget share and unit value equations, with the logarithms of total expenditure and (unobserved) prices as explanatory variables, and Deaton's specification (henceforth model (D)) is basically a first order Taylor approximation. Crawford et al. (1997) have developed an alternative approach which exploits the implicit links between quantity and unit value choices, resulting in a model which, in contrast to model (D), is consistent with demand theory (model (C)). Both specifications are currently used in empirical work, see for instance Ayadi et al. (1997) for model (D) and De Vreyer (1996) for model (C).
The purpose of this paper is to compare these two specifications: it may well be the case that the theory-consistent model (C) for the unit value equation is so badly misspecified that a first order Taylor expansion like (D) outperforms it in spite of its lack of internal consistency. We proceed as follows: choosing one of the models as the true model for a system with two goods, and a set of true values for its parameters, we compute the pseudo-true values of the parameters of the alternative model -i.e. the values minimising the Kullback contrast between the true joint distribution of the budget shares and unit values, and the distribution entailed by the alternative model. Keeping overall Marshallian elasticities fixed, we compare the way in which true and pseudo-true quantity and quality elasticities evolve as functions of the budget share W\ of one of the two goods. We repeat the procedure by reverting the roles (true and pseudotrue) of the two specifications. We also introduce a non-linear generalisation for the specification of Crawford et al. (model (G)), and perform a third comparison between models (C) and (D), taking the true distribution of the data to belong to model (G).
While many more comparisons could be undertaken, this already provides clear-cut answers: expenditure elasticities remain close, but we find large differences in price elasticities, and even some sign reversals. This suggests that the tractability of these functional forms in the situation where prices are not observed is paid by excessive inflexibility. Section 2 presents the three models (D), (C) and (G) and discusses the implied profiles of the various elasticities as functions of the budget share of one of the goods. Section 3 discusses the computation of pseudo-true values and Section 4 comments the graphs summarising the results.
Two Specifications and an Extension
We start with a brief exposition of Deaton's approach to modelling the determination of unit values. Goods are taken to be organised into m groups such as food, clothes, etc. Consumption within a group g is a vector of quantities q g . A group quantity index Q g is defined as Q g = k g .q g ,where k g is a vector of aggregating units typically chosen by the data collector. Group spending is x g = p g .q g , where p g is the vector of group prices. We assume that relative prices within each group are fixed, so that p g = ?r 5 p^, where 7r ff is defined as a scalar (Paasche) linear homogeneous price level for the group (for instance, the price for the aggregate "meat"), and p® g is a vector representing the fixed within-group relative price structure (for instance, the relative prices of different types and qualities of meat).
For each household we can define a unit value for each group of goods, V g = x g /Qg. Given the definitions above, this leads naturally to the definition of a "quality" index £ g : since
we have V g = 7r g £ g , with
Note that a specification in terms of the logarithm of unit values translates 4 immediately into a specification in terms of the logarithms of the quality indices.
Model (D):
Given the assumptions made by Deaton, the variables Q g , x g , £ g , V g , as well as related variables such as budget shares, w g = x g /X, will all be functions of X, the total expenditure, and TT, the vector of (unobserved) group prices. Thus, Deaton (1990) specifies a fairly general first-order Taylor approximation in the form Bs/{l+Ba)
leads to the simple form (2.5)
Model (G):
A common feature of models (D) and (C) is their linearity, which is central to the estimation strategies followed by Deaton (1990) and Crawford et al. (1997) : the price vector re is not observed, and linearity allows the use of fixed effect techniques to sweep it away, given regional information and the assumption that IT varies only between, but not within, regions. However, in this paper we do not focus on that estimation strategy, but rather on the properties of the two specifications above, and it is of interest to confront them with a more general specification, which does not need to satisfy linearity. A simple extension of model (C) satisfying the cross-equation restrictions (2.4) is: A few comments are in order. The homogeneity property is satisfied not only by the Marshallian elasticities, but also by the quality and quantity elasticities.
Quality elasticities are constant in model (D). Quantity elasticities in model (D)
and all elasticities in model (C) depend only on model parameters and on w g (linearly in it;" 1 ).-By contrast, elasticities for model (G) also depend on the product t, g Qg and are thus related in a more complicated way to w g .
Of course there are also linear relationships between elasticities for models (D) and ( (1 + B g ) while its magnitude also depends on b g . This makes it clear that a meaningful investigation of the plausible magnitude of these differences requires the establishment of a relationship between the parameters above. This is the subject of the next section.
Computation of Pseudo-true Values
In the sequel we consider only two goods. Thus u>2 = 1 -w\. We will assume that the distribution of w\ given the vector Z of explanatory variables (In ni t In 7T2, In X) is known. Denoting Y the vector of remaining endogenous variables (ln£ l5 ln£ 2 ), and considering a parametric model for the conditional distribution of Y given Z, with densities {/ (Y\Z,9) ,0 G O}, the pseudo-true value 9* of 9 is defined as
where £o denotes the expectation w.r.t. the true conditional distribution of Y given Z, and ^denotes the expectation w.r.t. the marginal distribution of Z (see e.g. Gourieroux and Monfort, 1989) .
Following Deaton (1990) we assume that the marginal distribution of Z is normal with expectation (4.6, 0, 0) and a diagonal variance matrix with diagonal (0.5, 0.1, 0.1). We also specify the conditional distribution of w\ given Zas normal with variance 0.0005 and expectation
with the numerical values a\ = 0, 8\\ = 0.046, 8\2 --0.066, (3 1 = 0.02. These choices again follow Deaton's, with the exception that we choose the value of 8\2 so as to ensure zero degree homogeneity of the budget share. 1 With these choices we obtain the following ranges for the overall Marshallian elasticities: We will describe case by case the assumptions concerning the distribution of (In £ >1 , In £2)5 but before that we outline the general procedure followed for the computation of pseudo-true values. The true model allows us to simulate any amount of data, and the use of a pseudo-ML estimator yields as precise an estimation as desired for the pseudo-true value. In order to economise on the number of simulations needed to achieve a given precision, we make use of the technique of antithetic variables (see e.g. Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993, 744-747 ).
In the sequel we will call "situation (X)" the situation where the true model is (X).
Situation (D):
We specify the conditional distribution of (In £ : , In £ 2 ) given Z as normal with a diagonal variance matrix with diagonal (0.1, 0.1) and expec- The specification retained for the pseudo-model (C) is:
1
Expressing the Slutsky matrix in terms of Marshallian elasticities we are able to check concavity of the corresponding cost function for each value of u>\\ we find that, for the chosen values of the parameters, concavity is satisfied for wi < 0.9. In interpreting the results we will thus focus on this range for w\.
where (£1, £2) is assumed bivariate normal with unrestricted covariance structure and zero expectation given Z. For a precision of 10~6 the number of simulations required was 1065. Technical details on the computation of the pseudo-true values, as well as a table recapitulating true and pseudo-true values, are given in the Appendix.
Situation (C):
We generate data using 
Situation (G):
The data is generated using 
Results
For each of the three situations above, we have produced a graph for each good and each type of elasticity (expenditure, own price, price of the other good) while grouping quantity and quality elasticities. This yields a total of 18 graphs of which we reproduce only two here. 2 We show results for w\ between 0.05 and 0.85.
As noted below Table 1 , the elasticities for model (G) do not depend solely on parameters and W\ but also on In {i g Q g ), or equivalently on In w g -\mr g + In X.
Setting 7Ti = 7T2 = 1 this becomes In w g + ln X and the expectation of the budget share for good 1 is w\ -(3-^ \nX, which yields a value of lnX corresponding to each value of w\.
The main findings are the following. The expenditure elasticities for models 2 The complete series of graphs will be provided upon request.
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Conclusion
This very limited experiment leads to surprisingly clear-cut conclusions on two specifications used for the estimation of demand systems on the basis of unit values: these two models can yield strikingly different results as concerns the decomposition of price elasticities in quantity and quality elasticities. Whether the fact that we have restricted overall Marshallian elasticities to coincide does trigger these discrepancies or in the contrary helps the models track each other is not entirely clear to us, but our conjecture is rather in favour of the latter assumption.
The conclusion we draw from the exercise is that, while these two specifications are attractive for the estimation of price reactions when only unit values and regional information are available -and prices themselves remain unobserved, the search for more flexible but tractable specifications of the unit value equations should be rewarding. 6 . Appendix: Technical details on the computation of the pseudo-true values
For ease of presentation we start with the case where model (C) is the true model.
Situation (C):
Given a data set of size iV we compute the ML estimate 9N of the parameters of model (D). For N -> oo this will converge to the pseudo true value 9*. The system to be estimated is a system of seemingly unrelated regressions with identical regressors, and given the normality assumption, the ML estimator coincides with OLS equation by equation (see e.g. Oberhofer and Kmenta, 1974) . Furthermore, the computation of the elasticities only requires knowledge of the slope parameters b g , d gg , d g h for g, h = 1, 2. The only piece of information we still need to acquire to compute these is the covariance matrix cov (In £, Z), which we approximate by simulation of the corresponding empirical moments.
Situation (D):
Here we have the problem that t g correlates with \nQ g :
E(t g \nQg) = g( gg ) E{t g ]nw g )-E(t g ]nQ,
and there is no reason why this should be zero. A possibility to approximate the pseudo-true value of the slopes B g is to compute the limit of the single equation instrumental variable estimator obtained with lnX as instrument. This is the product of cov (\nX,\nQ g y and cov (ln^,lnQ ? ) , which we approximate as above by simulation of the corresponding empirical moments.
Situation (G):
The only change concerns the data generation, and the computation of pseudo-true values for models (D) and (C) proceeds as above. 
